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This chapter presents new evidence on the productivity of U.S. universi-
ties. Our interest in this subject originates with recent developments in U.S.
higher education that strike us as noteworthy and perhaps troubling. First,
despite their high state, growth of employment and output in top U.S. re-
search universities has slowed down in recent years.1 And second, growth
of university research has not kept pace with that of industrial research.
This appearance of strain is linked to changes in funding, in which the fed-
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1. Data on the top 200 universities worldwide in The Times Higher Education Supplement
(2004 and 2005) suggest ﬁrst the preeminence of U.S. universities, and second the erosion of
this preeminence. Fifty U.S. schools are in the top 200. Where a lower rank is better, the mean
for twenty-seven U.S. privates is 67.7 in 2004 and 60.7 in 2005; for twenty-three publics the
rank is 72.5 in 2004 and 94.8 in 2005; the mean U.S. rank falls from 69.9 to 76.4. Shanghai Jiao
Tong University (2003 and 2005) ranks 100 schools worldwide in 2003 to 2005. In 2003 ﬁfty-
eight U.S. universities are in the top 100, while ﬁfty-three appear in 2005. The rankings of U.S.
universities improve, but since several publics drop out, it is not clear what to make of this.
Both rankings are controversial. The Times uses employer evaluations while the Shanghai
ranking uses a weighted average of objective data on prizes, papers, citations, and the like. I
thank Amanda Goodall for these references.eral share of university R&D has declined over time. Given the trends and
the reliance that ﬁrms place on universities, an analysis seems warranted,
to see whether the slowdown reﬂects a fundamental decline in university
prospects. We ﬁnd that research productivity grows at a healthy rate but
the allocation of R&D has grown less eﬃcient over time. While this has in-
terfered with aggregate productivity growth, increasing budget stringency,
especially in public universities, may be the root cause of the problem.
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 102 top U.S. universities,
sixty-eight of which are public and thirty-four private, whose outputs and
inputs we observe during 1981 to 1999. A key feature of our analysis is its
separation of productivity into research and teaching, with most of our
emphasis placed on research owing to data availability. The approach as-
sumes that research and teaching activities are on the whole separable. In
one sense, though, our approach makes a virtue out of necessity. Price in-
dex numbers for research and teaching that could combine the two into a
single index are missing for higher education.2
The deﬁnition of productivity is output per faculty-equivalent engaged in
research and teaching. Research output is papers and citations, teaching
output consists of undergraduate and graduate degrees, and numbers of
faculty are divided into researchers and teachers. Equipped with these 
measures, we begin the empirical work with a description of research and
teaching productivity. Next we decompose productivity growth into sources
within and between universities, and also groups of public and private uni-
versities. Finally, using regression analysis, we examine the determinants of
productivity in individual universities.
Beginning with trends, we ﬁnd that faculty in top 102 schools grow at 0.6
percent per year, while research faculty, a close approximation to re-
searchers in science and engineering, grows at 1.4 percent a year. Both are
low compared with growth of scientists and engineers in U.S. industry. In all
universities during 1981 to 1999, full-time faculty grow at 1.5 percent a year,
while all faculty grow at two percent (National Science Board 2004, vol. 2,
table 5-17). By comparison, growth in the industrial science and engineer-
ing workforce is 4.9 percent a year during 1980 to 2000 (National Science
Board 2004, vol. 1, chapter 3). The university sector is a less important em-
ployer of U.S. scientists and engineers by 2000 than it was in 1981.
Also, we ﬁnd that researchers increase more rapidly than teachers. By
our reckoning, researchers grow at 1.4 percent a year while teachers grow
at 0.3 percent. At the same time, papers per researcher grow at 1.4 percent
a year and citations to these papers grow at 6.7 percent. Research produc-
tivity is clearly rising. A cautionary note is that growth in citations and real
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2. In the future, the R&D satellite accounts at the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis could
ﬁll this gap.research growth are not necessarily the same, given the falling cost of cita-
tions and worldwide growth in the number of citing researchers.3
Research productivity in private universities is roughly twice that of
public universities. The growth rate of research productivity is also greater
in private universities (where papers and citations grow at 2.2 and 8.6 per-
cent per year) than in public universities (where growth is respectively 1.2
and 6.2 percent). The growth rate of research productivity is therefore two-
thirds to one-third higher in private universities.
Findings on teaching productivity are as follows. The 102 universities
produce 4.5 undergraduate degrees per teacher and 2.6 graduate degrees.
Undergraduate degrees are 50 percent lower per teacher in private univer-
sities, but then graduate degrees per teacher are 50 percent higher in these
universities. So, productivity in public and private institutions is roughly
equal. Over time, however, teaching productivity drops slightly in private
universities, while it increases at one percent a year in public schools.4
These quantity indexes do not capture changes in the value of higher edu-
cation, nor do they capture changes in quality, but they represent a start on
the problem of measuring teaching productivity.
Besides the study of trends, we examine sources of growth in aggregate
productivity. By this we mean a shift-share analysis that decomposes aggre-
gate growth into growth within universities, growth between universities,
and the covariance of growth in shares and productivity growth. Findings
from the decomposition are these. Across all universities the within-
university component of growth accounts for more than 100 percent of
growth in research output. The between-university contribution is smaller
but remains positive. But the covariance of growth in research shares with
growth in research productivity is negative. This implies that research
shares grow faster in universities where productivity growth is slower.
The decomposition yields similar results within groups of private and
public universities. The covariance term is always negative and research
grows faster in universities where research productivity grows more slowly.
This result suggests growing allocative ineﬃciency in research in higher
education. Analysis of sources of growth in teaching productivity tells a
similar story. More than 100 percent of growth is accounted for by the within
component, the between component is small but positive, and the covari-
ance term is strictly negative.
Regression analysis of research and teaching productivity concludes the
empirical work. We ﬁnd that R&D, endowment, and postdoctoral stu-
dents increase research productivity but that research is subject to de-
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3. See the remarks of Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg in ch. 13 of Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2002).
4. The comparison between top-ten research universities and non-top-ten schools is
similar.creasing returns. In public universities (but not private) there is evidence
that graduate students contribute to research productivity. The nonfederal
R&D stock in a university is linked to a decline in research productivity.
This result disappears when ﬁxed eﬀects are included so that we are unable
to identify a within-university eﬀect of nonfederal R&D. One interpreta-
tion is that nonfederal funds are subject to earmarking and are awarded
under less stringent competitive conditions. Another is that the goal of
nonfederal funds is less to produce research than to produce information.
Regardless of the interpretation, the share of nonfederal funds in univer-
sity R&D stocks grows by 19 percent over the sample period. Overall, it
comprises 40 percent of funding in the publics, versus 20 percent in the pri-
vates. It could be a factor in productivity diﬀerences among public and
private universities.
Regression analysis ﬁnds that undergraduate teaching productivity in-
creases with enrollment, and (in public universities) with graduate assis-
tants. In public universities state appropriations are linked to a decline in
undergraduate degrees per teacher. Production is not subject to decreasing
returns to the same degree as research, suggesting that variation in univer-
sity size is primarily a matter of teaching and not research.
Graduate teaching productivity increases with graduate students and
R&D. However, the output of graduate degrees decreases with the non-
federal share of R&D, suggesting that unlike federal R&D, nonfederal
funds are not for the support of graduate students. Reassuringly, graduate
students are at least as important in their own education as they are in fac-
ulty research.
The rest of the chapter consists of ﬁve sections. Section 11.2 describes
productivity measurement and presents identities that decompose produc-
tivity growth into within, between, and covariance components. In addi-
tion, the section speciﬁes productivity regressions. Section 11.3 discusses
the database and presents descriptive statistics. Section 11.4 carries out the
decomposition analysis of productivity growth. Regression ﬁndings are
presented in section 11.5. Section 11.6 is a discussion and conclusion, with
emphasis on the challenges facing public universities in the United States.
11.2 Analytical Framework
11.2.1 Productivity Deﬁnitions
The productivity index that we use in this chapter is output per faculty
member.5 But university faculties produce both research and teaching.
Can labor productivity be measured separately for both? Our best but also
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5. We rely on labor productivity for the usual reason in productivity studies, that we lack
data on physical capital stocks that would give us indices of total factor productivity.very imperfect answer is yes. We can exploit expenditure shares on re-
search and teaching to construct estimates of research and teaching fac-
ulty-equivalents and labor productivity in research and teaching. This of
course assumes that these outputs are separable in production. While the
assumption seems reasonable for research and undergraduate teaching, it
is less promising for research and graduate education. To an unknown ex-
tent these are jointly produced, but for practical reasons we set this com-
plication to one side. First, undergraduate teaching dominates most uni-
versities and this conforms to the assumption of separability. Second,
statistics of teaching expenditures by universities do not distinguish un-
dergraduate and graduate students. Estimated teaching faculty exceeds
the number of undergraduate teachers. The result is a downward bias in
undergraduate teaching productivity. Third, the proportion of graduate
teaching in all teaching is higher in universities of the ﬁrst rank. Omitting
graduate teaching would bias teaching productivity comparisons between
schools. A related reason for including graduate students is that top U.S.
research universities have increasingly emphasized graduate teaching.
Omitting graduate education would underestimate the growth of teaching
productivity. So while research and graduate education have joint pro-
duction aspects, there are reasons for provisionally treating the two as
separable.
We therefore use the following indexes of labor productivity in research
and teaching:
(1) LPjit   . j   R, I
Output and faculty form the numerator and denominator of (1). Subscript
j   R, I stands for research (R) and instruction (I), subscript i indexes uni-
versities, and t stands for time.
11.2.2 Decomposition of Productivity Growth
Section 11.4 uses a shift-share analysis to decompose research and
teaching productivity growth into within, between, and covariance com-
ponents.6 We apply this decomposition to the explanation of productivity
growth in universities and groups of public and private universities.
To simplify notation we drop subscript j   R, I and let LP stand for ei-
ther research or teaching. Also, let LPt represent the weighted average of
productivity across universities and let LPit stand for productivity of uni-
versity i. Finally, let sit Qit/ Σ
N
i 1Qitbe the share of university iin total out-
put Σ
N
i 1Qit. The share variable serves as a weight in the decomposition.




Growing Allocative Ineﬃciency of the U.S. Higher Education Sector  353
6. See, for example, Foster, Krizan, and Haltiwanger (2001).(2)  LP t   LP t   LP t 1
 Σisit 1 LP it  Σi sit LP it  Σi sit(LP it 1   LP t 1).
Within-University Covariance Between-University
The change in aggregate productivity consists of three terms. The ﬁrst is the
sum of changes in productivity within universities weighted by their share
in output. This is the within-university component. The second is the co-
variance of changes in shares with changes in productivity. It answers the
question, is growth in share positively or negatively associated with pro-
ductivity growth? The third term is the between-university component. It
is the sum of changes in shares times the diﬀerence between individual and
average productivity. This captures whether more eﬃcient universities on
average gain or lose share.
Equation (2) applies to individual universities, but we are also interested
in groups of private and public universities. The second part of the appen-
dix shows that
(3)  LPt   [ t 1· LPt
A   (1    t 1)· LPt
B]      t·( LPt
A    LPt
B)
Within-Group Covariance
     t·(LPA
t 1   LPB
t 1).
Between-Group
The ﬁrst term is the within-group component. It is the average across the
two groups of growth in productivity within each group using within-
group average productivity growth. The second is the covariance compo-
nent: growth in group A’s share times the gap between growth in its pro-
ductivity and group B’s. The third term is the between-group component:
the increase in group A’s share times the diﬀerence in its initial productiv-
ity and that of group B. We use (2) and (3) to decompose productivity
growth in higher education in section 11.4.
11.2.3 Productivity Regressions
Section 11.5 undertakes regression analysis of labor productivity. For
this purpose, as noted, productivity is derived from separable production
functions for research and teaching. We assume that labor productivity in
research takes an almost Cobb-Douglas form:
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⎭The term ARit captures productivity-augmenting features of universities.7
We decompose R&D of a university (KRit) into the nonfederal stock (KNF
Rit ),
on which we allow a discount or premium  R and the federal stock (KF
Rit).
The eﬀective R&D stock is KRit    R KRit
NF   KF
Rit.8 Also included in (4) are
time trend tand uRit, the error term in research productivity. Besides  R, the
parameters include  R, the output elasticity of labor;  R, the output elas-
ticity of the R&D stock; and  R, the coeﬃcient of time trend. The error
term uRit consists of a sum of variance components,
(5) uRit   vRi   vRt   eRit.
In (5) the error consists of components for university vRi and time vRt as
well as the innovation eRit. We sometimes include ﬁxed eﬀects in (4) to ab-
sorb university and time. As long as the innovation is unanticipated, in
these equations it will be orthogonal to predetermined variables on the
right of (4).
Returning to productivity ARit, one determinant of it is an indicator of
public or private control Ci. This aﬀects productivity through governance
and selectivity. Endowment Eit is used to hire star faculty and buy back
time, so we expect it to increase productivity. And both postdoctoral and
graduate students Mit and Git could augment faculty time. Research labor-
augmentation follows the constant-elasticity function,





Inserting this into (4), substituting (5) for the error, rearranging, and tak-
ing logarithms we reach the nonlinear regression
(6) ln (QRit / LRit)    R ln(BR)    Rt    R RCCi    R RE ln(Eit / LRit 1) 
   R RM ln(Mit / LRit 1)    R RG ln(Git / LRit 1) 
   R ln[( RKRit
NF   KF
Rit) / LRit 1] 
  [ R(1    RE    RM    RG)    R   1]ln(LRit 1) 
  vRi   vRt   eRit.
Section 11.5 reports estimates of (6). When constant returns to scale hold,
the coeﬃcient on the logarithm of LRitvanishes. Otherwise its sign captures
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7. The (almost) Cobb-Douglas assumption means that Hicks-neutral shifts cannot be
distinguished from factor augmentation. For convenience we treat all shifts as labor aug-
menting.
8. This functional form allows a direct comparison between the eﬀects of a dollar of non-
federal and federal R&D stock. As far as we are aware, use of this device appears ﬁrst in
Griliches (1986), who used it to distinguish the eﬀects of basic and applied research on ﬁrm
productivity.the direction of divergence from constant returns.9 Notice that we lag LRit
on the right by one year to limit division error bias.
Teaching productivity can be similarly modeled. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function for baccalaureate and graduate degrees, we
obtain the following speciﬁcation for teaching productivity






As with (4), we consider the error term to consist of a sum of variance com-
ponents:
(8) uIit   vIi   vIt   eIit.
The error again consists of components for university vit and time vit and
the innovation eRit. Thus, we sometimes include ﬁxed eﬀects to absorb uni-
versity and time. As long as the innovation is unanticipated, in these equa-
tions it will be orthogonal to predetermined variables on the right of (7).
Labor augmentation AIit depends on teaching skill and other aspects of
teaching. Included are enrollments or stocks of students in residence Sit;
time trend t; and uIit, the error term in teaching productivity. Parameters
are  I, the output elasticity of labor;  I, the output elasticity of enrollment;
and  I, the coeﬃcient of time trend.
Determinants of instructional labor-augmentation AIit again include
public or private control Ci. A second determinant, in public universities,
is state teaching appropriations per teacher Tit. This could be destined for
the reduction of class size. If so, we expect it to reduce degrees per teacher.
Alternatively, state appropriations could alter the composition of educa-
tion in favor of graduate education. But in addition, Tit could increase the
quality of education. And third, graduate students Git per teacher could
substitute for faculty in undergraduate teaching. Thus, instructional labor-
augmentation is represented by the constant-elasticity function,




Next insert AIit and the equation error (8) into (7) and take logarithms:
(9) ln(QIit / LIit)    I ln(BI)    It    I ICCi    I IT ln(Tit/LIit 1) 
   I IG ln(Git/LIit 1)    I ln(Sit/LIit 1) 
  [ I(1    IT    IG)    I   1] ln(LIit 1) 
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9. Adams and Griliches (1998) regress the logarithm of research output on the logarithm
of R&D stock. They ﬁnd that the speciﬁcation exhibited diminishing returns at the university-
ﬁeld level and constant returns at the ﬁeld level. They also consider the role of graduate stu-
dents in R&D. But they did not examine labor productivity, because such data were not avail-
able.We also include the logarithm of R&D stock in some of the graduate stu-
dent equations, using the same functional form  Kln(KRit)    Iln ( IKRit
NF 
KF
Rit), as in (6). Section 11.4 reports estimates of (9). If constant returns
holds, then the coeﬃcient on LIitdisappears; otherwise its sign captures the
divergence from constant returns. As before, we lag LIitto limit division er-
ror bias.
11.3 Description of the Data
11.3.1 Database of Universities
This study is based on 110 universities that account for most academic
research in the United States. The primary data sources that we use are the
Institute for Scientiﬁc Information (ISI) for research outputs, the Inte-
grated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data from the Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for ﬁnances, faculty, salaries,
and degrees; and the National Science Foundation (NSF) CASPAR data-
base for academic R&D and graduate students. Since data are missing for
eight universities, this study examines 102 schools. Allowing for lags we ob-
serve universities during 1982 to 1999. Thus, before missing values are re-
moved, the data form a panel of 1,836 observations (eighteen years times
102 universities).10
Included in the panel are faculty counts, research and teaching expendi-
tures, research outputs consisting of papers and citations, and teaching
outputs consisting of baccalaureate and graduate degrees. We use the ex-
penditure data to allocate faculty between research and teaching. These
data yield labor productivity statistics in research and teaching. In addi-
tion, we construct R&D stocks, endowment, stocks of graduate students,
undergraduate enrollments, and indicators of public-private control.11The
rest of this section describes the variables and calculations that we have
performed using them.
11.3.2 Faculty Statistics
The data include estimates of faculty counts by university. We use
tenure-track and non-tenure-track faculty counts from the National Cen-
ter for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Faculty Salary Survey, available
through the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS). Figure
11.1 shows tenure-track and non-tenure-track faculty over time. Non-
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10. Because research and teaching faculty are lagged one year on the right of equations (5)
and (7), the 1981 data are excluded from the regressions.
11. The R&D is overcounted because of transfers between universities. Such transfers
should be deducted from the R&D of sending universities and added to the R&D of receiv-
ing universities, but this is not the current practice.tenure-track faculty grow at a slightly faster rate than tenure-track faculty,
but not by enough to change the non-tenure-track share, which remains at
nine percent throughout the period.12
Because faculty engages in research and teaching and these tend to be
competing uses of time, we would like to obtain faculty-equivalents in
these activities. If these were mutually exclusive, then production functions
for research and teaching would be separable. This assumption is not as
reasonable for graduate education, where teaching and research are to an
extent jointly produced.13But as noted in section 11.2, it is necessary to tol-
erate some inaccuracy in the allocation of faculty to research and teaching.
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12. National Science Foundation data show that the share of part-time faculty during 1981
to 1999 rises from 19 percent to 28 percent in research universities (National Science Board
2004, vol. 2, table 5-17). We studied the use of part-time faculty using the biennial NCES Fall
Staﬀ Surveys from 1987 to 1997. Leaving aside graduate assistants, we ﬁnd that the thirty-
four privates use a higher proportion of part-time faculty than the sixty-eight publics. How-
ever, the part-time proportion grows faster, by 24 percent versus 10 percent. This suggests that
the Salary Survey may understate relative faculty growth in public universities. But the Fall
StaﬀSurvey data are rather noisy; and they fail to classify graduate assistants by teaching and
research function. The evidence presented in table 11.9 suggests that graduate students are an
important substitute for faculty in public universities.
13. Modern graduate education is often credited to the nineteenth century chemist Justus
von Liebig, who learned how to combine graduate teaching with laboratory research. See the
entry on von Liebig in the Encyclopedia Britannica and Mokyr (2002).
Fig. 11.1 Average number of faculty, 102 universities, 1981–1999The data on teaching expenditures do not distinguish undergraduates from
graduates, and removing graduate education as an output biases the con-
tributions of diﬀerent universities.
Thus, we employ research and teaching expenditure to separate faculty
into research and teaching components. Note that these categories exclude
administration, sports, and auxiliary enterprises such as food and dormi-
tory services, hospitals, and student organizations. This seems correct
since the primary activities of faculty are teaching and research. Notice
also that research expenditures REXP itinclude separately budgeted expen-
ditures that are internal and external to the university. However, research
is almost entirely in science and engineering, so that research faculty are a
close approximation to researchers in science and engineering. Instruc-
tional expenditures IEXP it include expenditures for credit and noncredit
instruction. This includes all instruction: academic, occupational, voca-
tional, special session, community, and remedial and tutorial instruction.
Also included are research and public service that are not separately bud-
geted. One problem is that both research and teaching expenditure include
spending on capital and auxiliary personnel. Thus, use of the research ex-
penditure share could yield a biased estimate of research faculty. To guard
against this we include R&D stock (which includes capital expenditures) as
well as graduate students and postdocs in the regressions.
By this account the separation of research and teaching is imperfect. But
as an assumption, it is clearly an improvement on perfect multitask-
ing. That assumption argues that faculty members simultaneously teach
and perform research. We replace it with a better—even if imperfect—
approximation, that the proportion of research faculty equals the propor-
tion of research expenditures in both research and teaching expenditures
REXP it /(REXP it   IEXP it). Research and teaching faculty LRit and LIit in
university i at time t are to a ﬁrst approximation:
(10) LRit    Lit.
LIit   Lit   LRit
In (10) Lit is total faculty in university i at time t. Research and teaching
faculty are LRitand LIit, the denominators of labor productivity in research
and teaching in equations (1), (4), (6), (7), and (9). From what has gone be-
fore, research faculty are a close approximation to research scientists and
engineers, consistent with the deﬁnition of research output. There is how-
ever, a possible bias in this, which suggests that researchers are overesti-
mated and teachers underestimated. Because the research skill price ex-
ceeds that of teaching, research expenditures buy fewer researchers and
teaching expenditures buy more teachers than (10) would suggest. But
REXPit   
REXPit   IEXPit
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this bias.14
Figure 11.2 charts the course of the expenditure proportion REXPit /
(REXPit IEXPit). For all universities, the curve’s ﬁsh-hook shape reﬂects
the decline in research funding from 1981 to 1983 and its subsequent re-
covery and expansion. But the overall curve conceals diﬀerences between
public and private universities. In both cases the expenditure share declines
through 1983, but afterwards the pattern diﬀers. The research share in
private schools recovers to 0.38 in 1988 but then declines. This is consistent
with reductions in overhead rates for private schools in the late 1980s
(Ehrenberg 2003). The overall pattern in private universities is one of de-
cline, from 0.41 in 1981 to 0.36 in 1999. In contrast, the research share in
public universities rises from 0.33 in 1983 to 0.40 in 1999 and the overall
pattern is one of increase.
Table 11.1 reports means and growth rates of faculty, the research ex-
penditure proportion, and researchers and teachers. It does so for all uni-
versities, as well as public and private. Universities employ an average of
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14. Let f REXP/(REXP IEXP) as in equation (10), and let   (wR– wI) / wI 0, where
wR   research wage and wI   teaching wage and let n   measured total faculty. Then it can
be shown that the true number of researchers is n∗
R f /[f (1 – f )(1   )]nand the true num-
ber of teachers is n∗
I   [(1 – f )(1    )]/[f   (1 – f )(1    )]n. But unfortunately the value of  
is unknown, including its variation by university.
Fig. 11.2 Ratio of research to total expenditures, 102 universities, 1981–19991,048 faculty. The research expenditure proportion is 38 percent and an es-
timated 381 faculty are engaged to do research while 667 teach. Public uni-
versities employ 1,218 faculty, of which 444 are researchers and 774 teach-
ers. Employment in private schools is 703, of which 252 are researchers and
451 teachers.
Table 11.1 also presents growth rates. Researchers grow faster than
teachers by 1.4 percent a year versus 0.3 percent. Thus, research-intensity
of faculty is growing. Growth of researchers is faster in public universities,
while growth in teachers is faster in private universities.15 Figures 11.3 and
11.4 are graphs of research and teaching faculty. To concentrate on cumu-
lative growth and facilitate comparison we normalize each time series by
its 1981 value. Figure 11.3 shows that research faculty rise by almost 30
percent in the publics but by less than 15 percent in the privates. Figure
11.4 reveals that teachers grow by more than 30 percent in the privates but
decline slightly in the publics. For all universities, cumulative growth in re-
searchers is 25 percent by 1999 (ﬁg. 11.3) but only ﬁve percent for teachers
(ﬁg. 11.4). This suggests that the mix of faculty in top U.S. universities is
becoming more research-oriented.
11.3.3 Research and Teaching Outputs
To calculate labor productivity in research and teaching we require output
measures. We treat papers and citations as research outputs, comparable
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15. Because research expenditures that are not separately budgeted are recorded as in-
structional expense, the ﬁgures for instruction may include cross-subsidization of research by
teaching.
Table 11.1 Faculty by research and teaching function, public and private universities,
1981–1999
University classiﬁcation
Faculty indicator All Public Private
Means
Tenure-track   Non-tenure-track faculty 1,048 1,218 703
Research expenditure proportion 0.379 0.381 0.376
Research faculty-equivalents 381 444 252
Instructional faculty-equivalents 667 774 451
Annual percentage growth rates
Tenure-track   Non-tenure-track faculty 0.6 0.4 1.4
Research expenditure proportion 0.5 1.0  0.5
Research faculty-equivalents 1.4 1.6 0.8
Instructional faculty-equivalents 0.3  0.1 1.8
Notes: The universities are 110 top U.S. research universities, less eight schools with incom-
plete data. Means and growth rates of the expenditure proportion are weighted by expendi-
ture.Fig. 11.3 Research faculty equivalents, 102 universities, 1981–1999 (1981   1.0)
Fig. 11.4 Instructional faculty equivalents, 102 universities, 1981–1999 (1981   1.0)with patent statistics in industry. The articles derive from agriculture, as-
tronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, earth sciences, economics
and business, engineering, mathematics and statistics, medicine, physics,
and psychology. These ﬁelds account for nearly all research carried on in
universities and are closely linked to total research expenditures. The uni-
versities publish 2.4 million papers during 1981 to 1999 and the papers re-
ceive 18.8 million citations. For each paper we calculate the fraction that a
given university contributes. If two schools are listed each is assigned half
of the paper, if three are listed each is assigned one-third, and so on. Cita-
tions received are similarly assigned and in this way we limit the problem of
multiple counting of research output. The fractions are summed across
ﬁelds by year to arrive at fractional paper-equivalents of a university per
year. Fractional citations are similarly summed, and the citations are accu-
mulated over the ﬁrst ﬁve years since publication, yielding a ﬁve-year win-
dow on citations received. This right-truncates the citations. The ﬁve-year
window also cuts oﬀ citations in 1995, the last year for which a complete
record exists. Despite this, the ﬁve-year window standardizes citations re-
ceived and provides a quality dimension for research output.
Baccalaureate and graduate degrees are currently our indicators of
teaching output. At the present time we lack a quality indicator such as
cost or forward value of a degree.16The data are taken from NCES-IPEDS
degree surveys.
The upper half of table 11.2 reports mean research output consisting of
papers and ﬁve-year citations, and teaching output consisting of bac-
calaureate and graduate degrees. As before, we report data for all universi-
ties, as well as public and private. Universities publish 1,183 papers per
year: the papers account for 4,948 citations over their ﬁrst ﬁve years.
Private universities publish slightly more total papers and public universi-
ties slightly less, but private schools have a decided advantage in citations
(Adams and Griliches 1998), which probably signals diﬀerences in faculty
quality as reﬂected in salary (Ehrenberg 2003).
Universities produce 3,010 baccalaureate degrees and 1,747 graduate
degrees per year. Reﬂecting their size and specialization in undergraduate
education, public universities produce 3,795 baccalaureate degrees and
1,721 graduate degrees. Private universities produce 1,417 baccalaureate
degrees and 1,758 graduate degrees; they specialize in graduate education.
11.3.4 Labor Productivity in Research and Teaching
The lower half of table 11.2 reports means of productivity by type. The
data show an 85 percent advantage of private universities in papers (7.4
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16. One idea is to use National Association of Colleges and Employers (NACE) data on
starting salaries by major, but these are not available for use by academic researchers.papers versus 2.6 papers per faculty), and an almost three-to-one advan-
tage in citations (20.4 citations versus 7.4 citations per researcher).17
In table 11.2 total degrees per teacher are similar across university type.
Any diﬀerences show up in undergraduate and graduate productivity.18In-
deed, the total degree gap is small considering the concentration of private
schools on costly graduate education. The smaller output of undergradu-
ate degrees per faculty in these institutions again indicates their special-
ization in graduate education.
Figures 11.5 and 11.6 are graphs of research productivity over time.
Again, the series are normalized by 1981 values. All the series on papers
per researcher in ﬁgure 11.5 grow through 1995 and ﬂatten afterwards.
Private universities grow faster, with the divergence taking place during
1981 to 1995. By 1999, papers per research faculty grow by 20 percent in
public universities but by 40 percent in private universities. Figure 11.6 re-
ports citations received per faculty. The data series end in 1995, given the
ﬁve-year window on citations. Again, a gap opens up between privates and
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17. Means weighted by size of research faculty. Equally-weighted means for public and
private institutions are 3.8 and 4.9 papers per researcher, and 17.4 and 25.3 ﬁve-year citations
per researcher. We prefer weighted means, which give larger universities more weight and
oﬀer a clearer picture of overall research productivity.
18. Since the data do not allow us to distinguish undergraduate teachers from graduate
teachers, we are double-counting teachers in computing teaching productivity. Thus, it is not
all clear that fewer undergraduate degrees are produced per undergraduate teacher in private
schools, or that fewer graduate degrees are produced per graduate teacher in public schools.
Table 11.2 Research and teaching outputs and productivity, public and private
universities, 1981–1999
University classiﬁcation
Faculty indicator All Public Private
Mean research output
Papers 1,183 1,173 1,204
Five-year citations 4,948 4,170 6,526
Mean teaching output
Baccalaureate degrees 3,010 3,795 1,417
Graduate degrees 1,747 1,741 1,758
Weighted mean research productivity
Papers/research faculty 3.1 2.6 4.8
Five-year citations/research faculty 10.3 7.4 20.4
Weighted mean teaching productivity
Baccalaureate degrees/teaching faculty 4.5 4.9 3.1
Graduate degrees/teaching faculty 2.6 2.2 3.9
Notes: Means of research and teaching productivity are weighted by faculty size.Fig. 11.5 Papers per research faculty, 102 universities, 1981–1999 (1981   1.0)
Fig. 11.6 Five-year citations per research faculty, 102 universities, 1981–1995
(1981   1.0)publics during 1981 to 1995. By 1995 citations per researcher in public uni-
versities grow by 80 percent, but by 220 percent in private universities.
Table 11.3provides more evidence on the increasing productivity gap be-
tween public and private universities. Annual growth in papers is 1.4 per-
cent in all institutions and growth in citations is 6.7 percent. Comparable
ﬁgures in public universities are 1.2 percent (papers) and 6.2 percent (cita-
tions). Productivity growth in private universities equals 2.2 percent (pa-
pers) and 8.6 percent (citations).
The bottom half of the table shows growth in teaching productivity in all
universities of about one percent a year. The data show a decline in teach-
ing productivity in private universities of –0.6 to –0.1 percent, compared
with a rise of 1.2 to 1.4 percent in public universities. But again these mea-
surements lack a quality dimension.
Trends in baccalaureate and graduate degrees per teacher are shown in
ﬁgures 11.7 and 11.8. The ﬁgures show that all the growth in teaching pro-
ductivity occurs in public universities. Comparing these with ﬁgures 11.6
and 11.7 we see that as measured, productivity growth is faster in research
than teaching.
11.3.5 Other Data
We collected several other variables, including faculty salary, academic
R&D stocks, endowment, and state teaching appropriations, all expressed
in thousands of 1992 dollars. In addition, we collected lagged stocks of
graduate students from the NSF-CASPAR database.
Table 11.4 reports means of faculty compensation, consisting of wages
plus fringe beneﬁts, by faculty rank and university type. Mean compensa-
tion averages 65,000 in 1992 dollars. Compensation is higher in private uni-
versities, especially at the full professor level, so that the wage trajectory is
much steeper in these universities. Figure 11.9 shows that compensation
also rises at a faster rate in private universities. Both patterns are familiar,
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Table 11.3 Annual percentage growth rates in research and teaching productivity,
public and private universities, 1981–1999
University classiﬁcation
Productivity statistic All Public Private
Percentage growth in research productivity
Papers/research faculty 1.4 1.2 2.2
Five-year citations/research faculty 6.7 6.2 8.6
Percentage growth in teaching productivity
Baccalaureate degrees/teaching faculty 0.8 1.2  0.6
Graduate degrees/teaching faculty 1.1 1.4  0.1
Notes: The table covers 1981 to 1999 for papers and 1981 to 1995 for citations. Productivity
growth rates are weighted by faculty size. All growth rates are in percents per year.Fig. 11.7 Baccalaureate degrees per instructional faculty, 102 universities, 1981–
1999 (1981   1.0)
Fig. 11.8 Graduate degrees per instructional faculty, 102 universities, 1981–1999
(1981   1.0)but what is not as well known is how closely the public-private wage diﬀer-
ential tracks the diﬀerential in public-private research productivity (but
not teaching productivity). This advantage of private universities is of
course related to their ﬁnancial resources.
Past R&D funding contributes to current research output and it also in-
dicates research excellence. For both reasons it is correlated with research
productivity. The R&D stock is the lagged stock of research funding re-
ceived over the previous eight years, depreciated at 15 percent per year, and
expressed in thousands of 1992 dollars. The R&D pertains to the same
368 James D. Adams and J. Roger Clemmons
Table 11.4 Faculty compensation by rank, public and private universities, 1981–1999
University classiﬁcation
Faculty indicator All Public Private
Means
Assistant professor 49.1 48.7 50.0
Associate professor 59.3 58.5 61.2
Full professor 81.9 79.4 87.4
All ranks 64.7 62.6 69.5
Notes: Faculty compensation is expressed in thousands of 1992 dollars and includes fringe
beneﬁts in addition to wages.
Fig. 11.9 Faculty compensation, 102 universities, 1981–1999 (1981   1.0)ﬁelds of science and schools that yield the research output statistics.19 The
source of the R&D data is the NSF-CASPAR database.
We divide the R&D stock into federal and nonfederal components. This
is a likely factor in research productivity because nonfederal money could
be less subject to competitive pressures than federal grants and because it
may consist of contracts that provide information and advice rather than
publications.20Figure 11.10show that nonfederal R&D contributes 20 per-
cent of the private university stock but 40 percent of the public university
stock. The share of nonfederal R&D grows relative to the federal stock and
is 19 percent higher by 1999.
Endowment is used to attract highly skilled faculty and to support re-
search. For both reasons, endowment per faculty should increase research
productivity. Endowment could also reduce size of classes or support stu-
dents, although we fail to ﬁnd evidence for this. State appropriations could
reduce class size and degrees per faculty member but they could also ex-
pand graduate programs. These data derive from NCES-IPEDS surveys.
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19. The twelve ﬁelds are agriculture, astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science,
earth sciences, economics and business, engineering, mathematics and statistics, medicine,
physics, and psychology.
20. It is for this reason that we think that recent ﬁndings (De Figueiredo and Silverman
2006) that 5 to 6 percent of federal R&D dollars are earmarked and a source of ineﬃciency
represent an understatement of the problem. We agree that the federal question is interesting,
but we also believe that replacement of federal funds by nonfederal funds may be the larger
issue.
Fig. 11.10 Nonfederal share in R&D stock, 102 universities, 1981–1999The lagged stock of graduate students helps to produce research and un-
dergraduate teaching. It should increase research and teaching productiv-
ity, but besides this it is an output (Adams and Griliches 1998). The grad-
uate student data are drawn from the NSF-CASPAR database for the
twelve sciences in this study. Also taken from this source is the stock of
postdoctoral students, another input into research.
11.4 Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity Growth
Following equation (2), table 11.5 reports decompositions of aggregate
productivity growth in research and teaching. The table contains three
panels corresponding to all universities, as well as public and private. The
top line of each panel reports aggregate productivity growth. This is arith-
metic rather than percentage growth. It is the sum of the change in pro-
ductivity over all universities in a given set. By (2), the within-university,
covariance, and between-university components sum to the total except
for rounding error. The shares of each component in aggregate productiv-
ity growth are shown in parentheses.
The within-university component dominates. It is usually positive: the
exception is a small decline in teaching productivity within private univer-
sities. The covariance term is always negative: this implies that output
share grows more rapidly in universities where productivity grows more
slowly. The between-university component is usually positive: output
shares grow in universities whose productivity is above average. One ex-
ception to this is a slight decline in the between-university component of
citations.
We would like to compare table 11.5 with decompositions for the private
sector. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) oﬀers the closest compari-
son. In their ﬁndings for industry the within-establishment component is a
much smaller share of productivity growth.21 This is partly because net
entry contributes to industry growth. Entry is identically zero for top uni-
versities but besides this, the covariance term is positive in industry and
negative in higher education. In summary, while entry and between-
establishment reallocation increase private sector growth, they are either
not a factor (entry) or they decrease growth in universities (covariance).
Table 11.6studies growth in groups of public and private universities. The
decomposition follows equation (3). Within-group productivity growth is
positive but the covariance and between-group terms are negative in seven
out of eight cases. The results imply that the share in research and teaching
rises faster for the group whose productivity grows more slowly (covariance
component), and that the share grows faster for the group whose produc-
tivity is less (between-group component). In research it is the less eﬃcient
370 James D. Adams and J. Roger Clemmons























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.group of public universities whose share increases, while in teaching it is the
apparently less eﬃcient group of private universities.
11.5 Regression Findings
The empirical work concludes with regression analysis of research and
teaching productivity. Tables 11.7 and 11.8 contain ﬁndings on research
productivity in public and private universities. The dependent variable in
7.1 through 7.3 is the logarithm of papers per research faculty. The de-
pendent variable in 7.4 through 7.6 is the logarithm of ﬁve-year citations to
the papers per research faculty. Equations 7.3 and 7.6 include university
ﬁxed eﬀects while the rest exclude these eﬀects.
Consider papers per researcher in public universities. The coeﬃcient of
time trend is negative and signiﬁcant in 7.1 and 7.2 but is positive and sig-
niﬁcant in 7.3. This is consistent with the shift of research toward less pro-
ductive universities. Table 11.5 has shown that as a result, within-university
growth accounts for more than 100 percent of growth. This negative be-
tween eﬀect is included in 7.1 and 7.2 but is omitted from the within re-
gression 7.3.
Besides trend, the table includes the logarithm of R&D stock per re-
searcher, and it also includes the logarithm of lagged researchers, as a
check on returns to scale. The nonfederal coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly less
than that of federal R&D and it approximates zero in the citation regres-
sions.22 The R&D elasticity is always positive. The coeﬃcient of lagged re-
searchers is negative, suggesting decreasing returns to scale throughout.
Equation 7.2 adds endowment, graduate students, and postdoctoral stu-
dents to 7.1.23 The eﬀect of R&D stock declines but remains positive and
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22. The negative sign on nonfederal R&D does not hit a boundary because nonfederal
funds are small.
23. To be more precise, graduate and postdoctoral students are averages of stocks over the
previous three years.
Table 11.6 Aggregate productivity growth within and between groups of public and
private universities
Papers/ Citations/ Bacc. degrees/ Grad. degrees/
Productivity statistic res. faculty res. faculty teach. faculty teach. faculty
All universities (N   102)
Total productivity growth 0.701 (1.00) 8.625 (1.00) 0.585 (1.00) 0.470 (1.00)
Within group 0.755 (1.08) 9.339 (1.08) 0.709 (1.21) 0.403 (0.86)
Covariance  0.022 ( 0.03)  0.424 ( 0.05)  0.069 ( 0.12)  0.030 ( 0.06)
Between group  0.032 ( 0.05)  0.291 ( 0.03)  0.055 ( 0.09) 0.097 (0.21)
Notes: Productivity growth is the diﬀerence over 1981 to 1999. It is the arithmetic diﬀerence XT   X1 and not (XT  
X1)/  X1.The decomposition follows equation (3). The sum of the components may diﬀer slightly from the total because
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.signiﬁcant. Since R&D stock supports graduate and postdoctoral stu-
dents, part of its eﬀect is mediated by these variables, which are accordingly
positive and signiﬁcant. In 7.2, endowment has a small positive eﬀect. The
sign and signiﬁcance of lagged researchers again suggests diminishing re-
turns.
We include ﬁxed eﬀects in the within-university equation 7.3, which is
otherwise the same as 7.2. The elasticities of the R&D stock, graduate stu-
dents, and postdoctoral students decline in the within-university dimen-
sion but remain positive and signiﬁcant. Endowment is now negative and
signiﬁcant, which is puzzling. Diminishing returns are stronger than be-
fore.
Equations 7.4 through 7.6 report citation regressions whose setup fol-
lows 7.1 through 7.3. Compared to the earlier results trend growth is
higher, but consistent with table 11.5 it is still higher in the within regres-
sion 7.6. The discount of nonfederal R&D is even greater than for papers,
but this eﬀect disappears in 7.6. The elasticity of R&D stock is higher than
in the papers regressions, which suggests that part of R&D’s eﬀect occurs
through research quality. Diminishing returns to R&D continues to pre-
vail. The contribution of postdoctoral students (but not graduate students)
to research productivity remains positive and signiﬁcant once ﬁxed eﬀects
are included.
Table 11.8 reports similar results for private universities. Equations 8.1
through 8.2 and 8.4 through 8.5 are the total speciﬁcations for papers and
citations. As in table 11.7, the coeﬃcient of time trend reverses sign when
ﬁxed eﬀects are included in 8.3 and 8.6. When ﬁxed eﬀects are included, as
in 8.3 and 8.6, the elasticity of the R&D stock declines but this coeﬃcient
remains signiﬁcant. The estimate of the nonfederal coeﬃcient is imprecise:
in the papers equations 8.1 and 8.3 it is signiﬁcantly less than 1.0, but in 8.2
this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. The nonfederal eﬀect is signiﬁcantly less
than zero in 8.4 and 8.5 but does not diﬀer from 1.0 in the within equation
8.6. Overall, as in table 11.7, the nonfederal R&D coeﬃcient is less than or
equal to that of federal R&D. Endowment is consistently stronger in table
11.8, implying that private universities are adept at harnessing endowment
to raise their research productivity. The coeﬃcient of postdoctoral stu-
dents increases but the graduate student coeﬃcient decreases compared
with table 11.7. Thus, private universities rely more on postdoctoral stu-
dents to produce their research.
Finally we turn to tables 11.9 and 11.10, which contain regression ﬁnd-
ings for teaching productivity. The dependent variable in 9.1 through 9.3
and 10.1 through 10.3 is the logarithm of baccalaureate degrees per
teacher. In 9.4 through 9.6 and 10.4 through 10.6 it is the logarithm of
graduate degrees per teacher.
We begin with undergraduate productivity in public universities. Equa-
tion 9.1 includes time trend, the logarithm of undergraduate enrollments






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.per teacher, and following equation (7) the logarithm of teachers, to test for
the returns to scale to teaching.24 Time trend is insigniﬁcant. The loga-
rithm of enrollment is positive and signiﬁcant, and its coeﬃcient is robust
in 9.3 to the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects. We would expect it to be robust given
that students are inputs into their own education (Rothschild and White
1995; Winston 1999). The coeﬃcient of teaching faculty is positive and sig-
niﬁcant in 9.1, suggesting increasing returns. However, when ﬁxed eﬀects
are included in 9.3 this sign reverses. Thus, unlike research, where returns
are decreasing, the evidence on returns to scale is mixed in undergraduate
teaching.
Equation 9.2 includes the logarithms of graduate students, endowment,
and state appropriations per teacher. Graduate students play a signiﬁ-
cant role in public undergraduate education but it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that endowment has little eﬀect. State appropriations reduce degrees
per faculty, but the interpretation of this is unclear. Equation 9.3 adds
ﬁxed eﬀects to 9.2. Enrollment and graduate students remain important
determinants of baccalaureate degrees within universities, but state ap-
propriations drop out.
The graduate teaching equations conclude table 11.9. Equation 9.4 in-
cludes trend, graduate students, and lagged teachers. Trend is positive and
signiﬁcant, graduate students are a key input into their own education, and
the sign of lagged teachers provides some evidence of diminishing returns.
Equation 9.5 adds state appropriations per teacher. These increase output
of graduate degrees, the opposite of 9.2. Together this suggests that state
support substitutes graduate students for undergraduates. Because R&D
hones the research skills of graduate students, equation 9.5 also includes
the logarithm of the stock of R&D. The coeﬃcient of nonfederal stock has
a negative eﬀect on graduate degrees; this is insigniﬁcant in 9.6. Federal
R&D supports graduate education while nonfederal R&D does not. Equa-
tion 9.6 adds ﬁxed eﬀects to 9.5. Coeﬃcients of graduate students and
R&D stock remain signiﬁcant, but the signs of endowment, state appro-
priations, and lagged teachers change. In particular, the evidence on de-
creasing returns in this table is fragile and conﬂicting. Along with the evi-
dence on decreasing returns to research, it suggests that variation in
university size is primarily due to teaching.
Table 11.10 reports ﬁndings for private universities. Main diﬀerences
from table 11.9 are as follows: ﬁrst, there is evidence for decreasing returns
to undergraduate teaching in private universities. Second, unlike their role
in public universities, graduate students are not a signiﬁcant input for un-
dergraduate education. As before, graduate degrees do not increase with
nonfederal R&D.
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24. To be precise, undergraduate enrollment is the average undergraduate enrollment over
the previous three years.11.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter ﬁnds evidence of growing allocative ineﬃciency in U.S.
higher education. Our most compelling evidence for this claim derives
from research output, which is better measured than teaching output at
this time. We ﬁnd that universities whose productivity grows less rapidly
experience more rapid growth in research share. The allocation of research
between public and private universities has also grown less eﬃcient over
time. While the share of public universities grows more rapidly, their re-
search productivity grows more slowly. On top of this the between-
university component is negative: the public university share grows though
their research productivity is less. One suspect that might explain this
growing ineﬃciency is nonfederal R&D. Its more rapid growth and its
much larger role in public universities ﬁt the patterns that we observe. In
support of this view, tables 11.7 and 11.8 show that nonfederal R&D stock
decreases research productivity. Whether this result is due to less compet-
itive conditions attending nonfederal grants or whether nonfederal awards
produce less research by intention, we cannot say. According to tables 11.7
and 11.8, private university endowments also contribute to the gap in
public-private research productivity.
Our ﬁndings for teaching productivity are similar, but we are less con-
vinced by them. For starters, the quality dimension of instruction is miss-
ing. Falling class size could reﬂect a rising demand for quality due to
growth in wealth at the top of the distribution. This indicates that families
partly control the allocation of students to schools. Surely this moderates
allocative ineﬃciency in teaching.
A deeper interpretation of the observations might instead point to the ﬁ-
nancial fortunes of public and private universities over the past quarter
century. The public-private comparisons in this chapter are consistent with
rising teaching pressures on public universities that could well discourage
more productive researchers from applying for positions. This decline in
competitiveness might explain the increasing reliance, especially by state
universities, on nonfederal R&D that appears to detract from research-
productivity. On that interpretation, the rising allocative ineﬃciency of re-
search that we uncover results from funding pressures that render state
universities less competitive, and drive them to less productive funding
sources.
This view of the matter implies a stunning reversal of fortune for public
universities. Starting from the Morrill Act of 1862 and the Hatch Act of
1887, state universities oﬀered practical education in the agricultural and
mechanical arts to support local industry. For more than a century this for-
mula has achieved great successes (Huﬀman and Evenson 1993; Adams
2002). But in our own time it appears to have been less successful. This can
perhaps be traced to aging of the population and to the rising mobility of
Growing Allocative Ineﬃciency of the U.S. Higher Education Sector  379students, both of which weaken the appeal of state ﬁnance of universities.
If this interpretation is correct, then it suggests a diﬀerent and more priva-
tized approach to funding universities that would place greater reliance on
parental ﬁnance of teaching, and federal and private foundation ﬁnance of
research. In any event, some solution seems urgent if the United States is
to retain its preeminence in higher education, and subsequently in aca-
demic and industrial science, technology, and innovation.
Appendix
Productivity Decomposition
Section 11.4 uses the shift-share analysis described in Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Krizan (2001) to decompose productivity growth into within, be-
tween, and covariance components for universities. This section explains
the algebra underlying equations (2) and (3) of the text.
Decomposition among Individual Universities
Let LPtrepresent mean labor productivity across universities, LPitstand
for productivity of a university, and sit   Qit/ΣN
i 1Qit represent the share of
a university in total output. Then
(A1)  LPt   LP t   LP t 1
  ΣisitLP it   Σisit 1LP it 1   ΣisitLP it   Σisit 1LP it 1 
  Σisit 1LP it   Σisit 1LP it
  Σisit 1 LP it   ΣisitLP it   Σisit 1LP it
  Σisit 1 LP it   ΣisitLP it   Σisit 1LP it
  ΣisitLP it 1   ΣisitLP it 1   Σisit 1LP it 1   Σisit 1LP it 1
  Σisit 1 LP it   Σi sit LP it   Σi sitLP it 1.
To (A1) we add the term:
(A2) Σi sitLP it 1.
Equation (A2) equals zero because LP t–1 can be factored out and the sum
of the changes in shares is zero. Combining terms in the result yields equa-
tion (2) of the text:
(A3)  LP t   LP t   LP t 1
  Σisit 1 LP it   Σi sit LP it   Σi sit(LP it 1   LP t 1).
Within-University Covariance Between-University









⎭Decomposition among Groups of Universities
We are also interested in contributions of groups of universities A and B
to productivity growth. Let A and B exhaust the set of universities. Then
aggregate labor productivity growth is
(A4)  LP t   LP t   LP t 1   ΣisitLP it   Σisit 1LP it 1
  (ΣAsitLP it   ΣAsit 1LP it 1)   (ΣBsitLP it   ΣBsit 1LP it 1).
Notice that the sit weights do not add to 1.0 within groups. The following
equation rewrites the weighted averages of labor productivities in (A4) in
terms of within-group averages:
(A5)  LP t   ( tΣAsit
ALP it    t 1ΣAsA
it 1LP it 1)
  [(1    t)ΣBsit
BLP it   (1    t 1)ΣBsB
it 1LP it 1].
The three new terms in (A5) are:
(A6)  t   ΣAQit   (ΣAQit   ΣBQit)
(A7) sjt
A   Qjt   (ΣAQit), j ∈ A
sjt
B   Qjt   (ΣBQit), j ∈ B.
Factor total output from the denominator of (A4). Then multiply and di-
vide by the sum of output in each group using the within-group weights
(A7), yielding (A5). As a result we can rewrite (A5) as
(A8)  LP t   ( tLPt
A    t 1LPA
t 1)
  [(1    t)LPt
B   (1    t 1)LPB
t 1].
The top line of (A8) is
(A9)  tLPt
A    t 1LPA
t 1    t 1 ·  LPt
A      t ·  LPt
A      t · LPA
t 1.
The bottom line of (A8) equals
(A10) (1    t)LPt
B   (1    t 1)LPB
t 1   (1    t 1) ·  LPt
B
   (1    t) ·  LPt
B    (1    t) · LPB
t 1.
Substitute (A9) and (A10) into (A8) and combine terms using  (1 –  t)  
–  t. We reach
(A11)  LPt   [ t 1 ·  LPt
A   (1    t 1) ·  LPt
B]      t · ( LPt
A    LPt
B)
Within-Group Covariance
     t · (LPA
t 1   LPB
t 1).
Between-Group
(A11) is equation (3) of the text.
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